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Filling the Gap: The Retroactive Effect of
Vacating Agency Regulations
DANIEL H. CONRAD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When a court vacates an agency regulation, there is a serious
question as to whether or not the vacation should apply
retroactively. The practical effects of retroactive vacation are far
ranging; however, the true legal implications of courts striking
down agency regulations as unlawful has not been thoroughly
vetted.1 There is significant case law and publication regarding
the promulgation of regulations that apply retroactively, the issue
at hand, however, is not if it is appropriate for an agency to create
a regulation that affects the regulated community retroactively,
but rather when an agency creates an unlawful regulation
prospectively, what the retroactive effect of that regulation’s
subsequent vacation by the courts should be. The issue can be
viewed as a fundamental question of the rule of law. If a
regulation is current law, how can a court decision then be
applied retroactively to those who were following the law as it

* Daniel Conrad is the Legislative Counsel for the North Carolina
Conservation Network. He would like to thank Donald Hornstein, Aubrey L.
Books Professor of Law at the UNC School of Law, for all his help over the
years.
1. See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 293-94 (2003).
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stood? However, recent history and actions indicate retroactive
application of these judicial decisions may in fact be sound policy.
In the light of rampant midnight regulations2 and policy
shifts caused by rapidly changing governing powers, would it be
logical to allow inherently illegal regulations to have the rule of
law during the period between their inception and their vacation
by the courts?
Such a policy may only encourage the
promulgation of invalid regulations to benefit industry and other
interested parties as an administration prepares to leave office.
In addition, lack of a retroactivity doctrine can cause a race to
establish facts on the ground in order to ensure the invalid
regulations apply.3 This means that those benefitting from
potentially illegal regulations can race to establish their reliance
on the regulations by laying facts on the ground prior to the
regulation being vacated.4 Applying a court’s decision to vacate
the regulations retroactively has the power to make such an
action futile because the reliance on the previous regulation
would be irrelevant.
Recent developments regarding the regulation of mercury
provides an excellent example of the serious nature of the
question of retroactivity. While climate change dominates the
environmental landscape, an issue like mercury emissions, with

2. See John M. Broder, A Legacy Bush Can Control, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9,
2007),
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9801EED6163DF93AA3575AC0A9619C8B63&pagewanted=all
(“[every]
president comes into office complaining about the 11th-hour judicial
appointments and midnight regulations left on the White House doorstep by his
predecessor. And every president turns around and does the same to his
successor.”).
3. See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 157-160 (1978).
See also Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss at 14-25, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
No. 108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008).
4. Retroactivity does not fully solve this issue as several cases exemplify.
Once the “egg is scrambled,” so to speak, there may be no appropriate remedy.
See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97-98 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (“Normally when an agency so clearly violates the APA we would vacate
its action—in this case its “non-rule rule”—and simply remand for the agency to
start again. Unfortunately, because we denied preliminary relief in this case,
the 2001 program was launched and crops were plowed under. The egg has been
scrambled and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo ante.
Appellants suggested that if we were to vacate, the Federal Court of Claims
would have the responsibility of allocating damages.”).
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serious health and environmental justice attributes, can fly under
the radar.5 However, mercury poses serious health risks, and the
lengthy history of attempts to regulate mercury represents the
ongoing
battle
between
industry
and
environmental
organizations on how to properly regulate the toxic substance.6
In early 2008, when the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule delisting
mercury and other Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs) from Section
112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA),7 and with it vacated the Bush
Administration’s replacement Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) in
New Jersey v. EPA,8 it left a gap of administrative law to be
interpreted by state governments.
The court’s vacatur of CAMR returned the mercury and other
HAPs regulations applied to Electric Utility Steam Generating
Units (EGUs) (including coal-fired power plants) to the status quo
before CAMR was promulgated. Since EGUs were reaffirmed to
be listed under section 112(g), for a new EGU to be permitted an
applicant is again required to analyze, select, and install
Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) to any plant
design; this was the case prior to CAMR.9 This much is clear
however, the court failed to address a key point in its holding.
What was to happen to the thirty-two power plants in thirteen
different states that were permitted, but had yet to complete
construction, while CAMR was presented as valid law?10 From a

5. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MERCURY IN STREAM ECOSYSTEMS (2011),
available at http://water.usgs.gov/nawqa/mercury/ (a recent study by the U.S.
Geological Survey found widespread mercury contamination in the nation’s
streams and waterways and concluded that mercury is the second leading cause
of stream impairment throughout the nation).
6. See Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) for Power Plants, History,
U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/history.html (last
updated July 28, 2011).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006).
8. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
9. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B).
10. Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, 32 Coal-Fired Power Plants in
13 States Now Up in the Air After Major Court Ruling on Mercury (Feb. 28,
2008) [hereinafter NRDC], available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/2008/
080228.asp (“[t]he states identified with the most coal-fired power plants now up
in the air are: Michigan (four), Wyoming (four), Illinois (three), Nevada (three),
Ohio (three), Pennsylvania (three), Texas (three), Iowa (two), Kentucky (two),
Louisiana (two), Georgia (one), New Mexico (one) and North Carolina (one). The
ruling will impact various aspects of three dozen or more coal-fired power
plants, including some now already under construction. Major coal-fired power
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legal standpoint, were those permits now invalid? Is a MACT
analysis for mercury and other HAPs now required for each EGU
permitted while CAMR was thought to be valid law? There is a
split among various state departments of environment and the
entities responsible for permitting EGUs concerning these
questions.
There is even a split within states in some
circumstances; other states simply do not know what they are
now required to do for those plants.11
A perfect example of the severity of this issue is the Cliffside
power plant, currently under construction in western North
Carolina. The proposed construction of a new 825 megawatt
(MW) facility at Duke Energy’s Cliffside site has ignited
controversy on both a local and national level. Locally, citizens
object to the construction of another coal plant that could emit
dangerous toxins and threaten public health.12 On the national
level, the issues encompass not only public health, but climate
change and energy policy as a whole. The construction of new
coal plants as opposed to investing in renewable energy sources is
seen by many as a slap in the face to curbing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and pushing towards a clean energy economy.
The Cliffside plant received its air permits in 2007 while
CAMR was still considered good law, but after the lawsuit
plants impacted by the ruling include: LS Power White Pine (1500 MW - permit
pending in Nevada); Sierra Ely (1500 MW - permit pending in Nevada); Toquop
(850 MW - permit pending in Nevada) Desert Rock (Sithe Global’s 1500 MW in
New Mexico); Longleaf (LS Power’s 1200 MW Plant in Georgia); Cliffside (Duke
Energy’s 800 MW Plant in North Carolina); Alliant Marshalltown (600 MW –
permit pending in Iowa); LS Power Waterloo (750 MW – permit pending in
Iowa); AMP (1000 MW – permit challenged in Ohio); LS Power/Dynegy (750 MW
in Michigan).”).
11. See Letter from Keith Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dept. of
Env. & Nat. Res., to Rich M. Roper, Manager, Cliffside Steam Station Duke
Energy Carolinas LLC (June 2, 2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/
permits/psd/docs/cliffside/Letter_Regarding_Cliffside_MACTs.pdf (“There is an
ongoing national debate over the impact of the decision. In particular, opinions
differ about whether the ruling affects a previously issued permit under which
construction has begun but is not completed.”); See also NRDC, supra note 10.
12. See generally Stop Cliffside Construction: New Legal Challenge by NC
Warn, N.C. WASTE AWARENESS & REDUCTION NETWORK [WARN] (May 5, 2009),
http://www.ncwarn.org/2009/05/stop-cliffside-construction-nc-warn-tellsutilities-commision-news-release/; See also Citizens Gather for Biggest NC
Climate Action in 2 Decades!, SOUTHERN ENERGY NETWORK BLOG (Apr. 19, 2009),
http://southeastenergy.wordpress.com/2009/04/19/citizens-gather-for-biggest-ncclimate-action-in-2-decades/.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/1

4

2011]

RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF VACATURS

5

challenging it had been filed. After seeing the oral arguments in
New Jersey v. EPA, Duke Energy raced to begin construction of
the plant (getting their facts on the ground in the event of a
challenge). That way, if the regulations were vacated, they could
claim they had already begun construction. Just nine days after
ground was broken at the Cliffside site, the holding in New Jersey
v. EPA was delivered, vacating CAMR. Yet, Duke Energy claims
that because they had commenced construction prior to the
ruling, they can apply the mercury standard in CAMR (a
standard ruled illegal because it did not adequately protect public
health), as well as not conduct the MACT analysis required after
the CAMR vacation.13 The Supreme Court has rejected this
“facts on the ground” rationale in regard to applying recently
promulgated statutes to already commenced projects of
significant investment, specifically with the Endangered Species
Act.14 However, it remains to be seen how this argument applies
to the vacatur of agency regulations.
A federal judge in the Western District of North Carolina
recently ruled against Duke Energy, ordering that Duke Energy
must conduct a MACT analysis for mercury and other HAPs at
the Cliffside site.15 Duke Energy has since appealed this ruling
and, in addition, successfully sought to reclassify the Cliffside
unit as a minor source. This is another action that would preclude
them from conducting the proper mercury emissions analysis

13. Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 3, at 3-14
14. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 168-170 (1978). In the Tellico
Dam case, Tennessee Valley Authority argued that because the provisions of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) provided that they protect the species at all
costs, and that the listing of the snail darter as an endangered species occurred
after significant construction had been completed on the Dam and the
alternative to completion would result in significant losses, that the injunction
on construction and application of the statute to them was unjust and should
not be allowed. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court
acknowledged that abandoning the dam “will produce results requiring the
sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of many million dollars in
public funds.” However, the Court affirmed the appellate court decision that
“current project status cannot be translated into a workable standard of judicial
review. Whether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is irrelevant in calculating the
social and scientific costs attributable to the disappearance of a unique form of
life.”
15. S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ.
108CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008).
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required for major sources; it rendered the appeal moot, save an
issue of attorney’s fees.16
The Cliffside case touches on many issues: public health, the
environment, global warming, hazardous air pollutants,
industry’s power in politics, fairness, and rule of law. All of these
issues hinge on the retroactive effect of the vacatur of agency
actions. To dissect the true effect of vacatur on administrative
regulations, and the time period when they were believed to be
valid, this article will examine several aspects of both
environmental regulations and administrative law. First, the
article will examine the governing case law regarding vacatur.
This analysis will include case law defining vacatur and
retroactivity, as well as retroactive application of decisions. Since
this article is focused on the retroactive nature of a judicial
vacatur, it will not explore the more traditional case law
surrounding promulgating regulations that apply retroactively
and the different types of retroactivity associated with that
practice.17 It will also look at options other than vacatur as a
remedy available to the court and how these may shed light on
the implications of vacating a regulation. Second, to show the
practical effect of this analysis, this article will look specifically at
the reasoning in the New Jersey v. EPA decision that vacated
CAMR. This will include an examination of the reasons behind
mercury and other HAPs regulations, which shows the
importance of the issue and a real life application of the
retroactivity doctrine. This article will examine a recent federal
decision, the Cliffside power plant case discussed earlier, which
covers this exact issue as the petitioners argued that Duke
Energy was in direct violation of the CAA by continuing
construction with a permit that relied on the since-vacated CAMR
regulations.18 It will establish whether or not it is consistent
with the interpretation of the law presented in the earlier
16. See Press Release, N.C. Dept of Env. and Nat. Res., DENR Responds to
Court Order for Expedited Decision on Cliffside HAP Emissions (Mar. 13, 2009),
available
at
http://www.ncconservationnetwork.org/documents/
cliffsideHAPSfinal.pdf; see also Bruce Henderson, Federal Cliffside Lawsuit
Dismissed, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 3, 2009), http://www.istockanalyst.com
/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3330813.
17. See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
18. See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No.
1:08CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008).
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sections. Finally, the article will explore the positive and
negative policy implications of such a retroactive effect as applied
to administrative regulations.
There is strong support for the assertion that the decision in
New Jersey v. EPA should be applied retroactively. The definition
of “vacate” in the D.C. Circuit’s case law refers to returning to the
status quo, voiding and starting anew as if the regulation never
existed.19 The Supreme Court has defined the retroactive nature
of a decision as:
[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law
and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such
events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.20

The Supreme Court has also identified criteria that must be
established to avoid the default retroactive application of a
ruling, none of which appear to be met in the current fact
patterns.21
The D.C. Circuit has applied these rulings to
administrative law decisions, similar to N.J. v. EPA.22
Additionally, there is case law supporting the notion that when a
vacated law was relied on, the result of this reliance could be
challenged and overturned.23
The facts that the D.C. Circuit had several options for
remedy, other than vacating CAMR, and that prospective-only
decisions are uncommon in administrative cases,24 add weight to
the claim that the holding should apply retroactively. The
rationale for several of these unexercised options is to avoid the

19. See Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also
Action on Smoking & Health v. Civ. Aero. Bd., 713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
20. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
21. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759 (1995).
22. See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 59
F.3d 1281, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
23. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (vacating the
RCRA “mixture rule” that had been law for almost ten years); See also United
States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1992)
(overturning prior convictions that were based in part possibly on the “mixture
rule” which was vacated post-conviction).
24. Levin, supra note 1, at 359.
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negative consequences and disruption caused by vacating a law,
and to provide a proper remedy when no retroactive remedy is
available due to the existence of irreversible actions occurring in
reliance on the vacated regulation.25 Finally, from a policy
standpoint, it would not make sense to allow agencies to make
illegal regulations and have them stand as good law during the
period prior to being vacated. The Cliffside example illuminates
this point given the public health concerns governing the
regulation of mercury and HAPs in general.
II. DOES A VACATUR OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY REGULATIONS APPLY
RETROACTIVELY?
A. Case Law Defining Vacatur
When the D.C. Circuit vacated the CAMR, it did not describe
what the effect of vacating the rule would be. The D.C. Circuit
handles almost all of the cases that seek to invalidate an agency
regulation.26
To determine the D.C. Circuit’s intent when
vacating a rule, we must first look to the definition of “vacate” as
used by the D.C. Circuit, and then analyze the possible
retroactive effects of vacating regulations.
The D.C. Circuit has defined “vacate” in several instances. In
Environmental Defense v. Leavitt, the D.C. Circuit stated: “[w]hen
a court vacates an agency’s rules, the vacatur restores the status
quo before the invalid rule took effect and the agency must
initiate another rulemaking proceeding if it would seek to
confront the problem anew.”27 The Court in Leavitt goes on to
25. See Allied Signal Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146,
153 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla v. Veneman, 289
F.3d 89, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d
747, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (choosing not to vacate because there is no way to
restore the “status quo ante”).
26. See HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES, UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 13 (2011), available at
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL%20-%20RPP%20%20Handbook%202006%20Rev%202007/$FILE/handbook20091201rev20091106
.pdf
27. Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
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state that when the regulations were vacated, EPA was placed in
a situation where it had failed to meet its duty to promulgate
regulations by the required date, despite the fact that it had
promulgated regulations prior to the statutorily granted
deadline.28 Application of this definition to the New Jersey v.
EPA decision results in a restoration of the status quo for
mercury and HAPs regulation, and thus requires a case-by-case
MACT analysis before a permit can be issued for the construction
of a power plant.
The D.C. Circuit definition of “vacate” does not explain what
happens to permits and already-commenced constructions that
rely upon the vacated rule. Further definitions, however, make it
clear that vacating a regulation should make it seem as if it never
had existed and restore the status quo ante.29 Taken literally,
returning to the status quo ante would not only invalidate the
regulations but also actions that relied upon the illegal
regulation, since these actions would not have occurred or been
permissible had the regulation not existed. However, this line of
reasoning is not directly discussed in these definitions. Before
one can assert that vacating a regulation that was previously
relied upon has the consequence that the reliance is invalid as
well, one must look further than the case law defining “vacate”
and delve into case law determining the retroactive effects of a
holding.
B. Supreme Court View of Retroactive Application of
Court Decisions
A series of Supreme Court decisions have addressed exactly
how court decisions apply retroactively, the implications caused
by such retroactivity, and the possibility of retroactive court

28. Id. at 65.
29. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Civ. Aero. Bd., 713 F.2d 795, 797
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[t]o vacate, as the parties should well know, means to annul;
to cancel or rescind; to declare, to make, or to render, void; to defeat; to deprive
of force; to make of no authority or validity; to set aside. Thus, by vacating or
rescinding the recessions proposed by ER-1245, the judgment of this court had
the effect of reinstating the rules previously in force.”); see also Sugar Cane
Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also
Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (choosing not to
vacate because there is no way to restore the “status quo ante”).
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holdings causing detrimental repercussions. The case law has
changed dramatically over the last forty years.
a. Chevron Oil v. Hunson
The Supreme Court addressed the retroactive potential of a
decision in 1971 in Chevron Oil Co. v Hunson. In this case, a
worker was injured while working on an offshore drill off the
coast of Louisiana.30 After waiting several years, he sued
Chevron Oil using admiralty laws as the authority for the suit.31
During the discovery phase of the lawsuit, the Supreme Court
announced its holding in the case of Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co.32
The Rodrigue holding changed the
interpretation of a particular act, making the admiralty laws no
longer applicable in Hunson’s case. Instead, Louisiana state laws
would now govern such an action.33 The Louisiana laws carried a
one-year statute of limitations, which would have lapsed prior to
the suit being filed by Hunson.34
To decide whether or not the ruling would apply
retroactively, as they acknowledged most do, the Supreme Court
used a three-factor test. For a holding not to be applied
retroactively, the factors considered included whether: (1) the
decision established a new principle of law by either overruling
clear past precedent or deciding an issue of first impression not
easily foreseen; (2) the prior history and purpose of the rule in
question should be examined, while questioning if retroactive
application of the decision will further retard its operation; and
(3) the inequity caused by retroactive application must be
examined.35 In this case, the Supreme Court found that Rodrigue
was a case of first impression, overturning a long line of D.C.
Circuit’s case law stating that the use of admiralty laws was
proper. Additionally, the goal of the act under interpretation was
to provide “comprehensive and familiar remedies” to individuals

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Chevron Oil Co. v. Hunson, 404 U.S. 97, 98-100 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106-107.
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such as Hunson.36 Retroactive application of the ruling in this
case would defeat this purpose by denying Hunson a remedy.
Finally, Hunson would have a great deal of inequity placed upon
him if the ruling was applied retroactively in this case.37
This type of selective application of retroactivity of a holding
on a case-by-case basis has since been disallowed in subsequent
cases.38 However, since the factors represent the most lenient
standard by which the Supreme Court would allow a decision to
not be retroactive unless explicitly stated, it is interesting to
apply these factors to the facts of the permitted EGUs. New
Jersey v. EPA did not overrule clear past precedent. It is possible
it may have been viewed as a case of first impression, but, given
the close proximity of the permits being granted (most less than
two years from their issue date), as well as the possibility that the
D.C. Circuit’s holding may have been “clearly foreshadowed,” this
factor is negated.39
Second, the purpose of the CAA is “to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population.”40 A prospective ruling that would allow a power
plant to be built that did not meet the requisite regulation levels
for mercury and other HAPs deemed necessary for public health
and safety would not advance this purpose. Finally, permitted
constructors would have an inequity argument that the
retroactive application would hurt them, since their plans and
construction relied on the old rule. However, when weighed with
the public health inequity argument that improper levels of
mercury and HAPs would be applied to EGUs, threatening public
health if the decision is not applied retroactively, the EGU
owner’s inequity argument may not be as strong as originally
thought.
In its entirety, it seems a strong possibility that when the
three factor test for non-retroactivity set out in Chevron Oil is
applied to EGUs permitted post-CAMR but prior to the ruling in
New Jersey. v. EPA, the holding would be determined to have a
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 107-108.
Id. at 108.
See infra Part II-B-b and c.
Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 106.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
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retroactive effect. While this analysis is useful because the
Chevron Oil standard presents the most leniency in determining
that a holding will not have a retroactive effect, recent case law
makes the application of this test unnecessary to reach the same
result.
b. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia
The first major case limiting the application of the Chevron
Oil factors is James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.41 In this
case, a law taxing out-of-state liquor disproportionally from instate liquor was found to violate the Commerce Clause, but the
decision was only applied prospectively; the James B. Beam
Distilling Co. sued to get back the disproportionate taxes they
had paid in reliance on the invalidated law.42 The lower state
courts relied on the Chevron Oil factors and claimed that the new
rule should only be applied prospectively43. The Supreme Court’s
reasoning divided holdings into three categories: (1) those that
apply completely retroactively; (2) those that apply solely
prospectively; and (3) those that are applied selectively
prospective due to an increased burden or reliance, sometimes
referred to by the court as a modified prospective ruling.44 The
Court acknowledged in its decision that applying a holding as
fully retroactive was “overwhelmingly the norm.”45
The state tax law in question in this case was deemed invalid
due to the ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.46 In Bacchus,
a Hawaiian tax, similar to the Georgia tax law in question, had
been struck down and the ruling was applied retroactively.47
This placed the ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court—that the
Beam ruling should be applied prospectively due to the Chevron
Oil factors—in the third modified prospective category since the
rule relied upon had been applied retroactively elsewhere. The
Supreme Court here found that selective prospectivity is not

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
Id. at 533-43.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 535-37.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 539.
James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 539.
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allowable and the Chevron Oil factors should not have been
applicable.48
Selective prospectivity was disallowed in criminal cases in
Griffith v. Kentucky.49 In its analysis, the Court, speaking of the
Bacchus ruling, stated that “[i]n most decisions of this Court,
retroactivity both as to choice of law and as to remedy goes
without saying.”50 The Court held that:
[o]nce retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new
rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective
application. The applicability of rules of law is not to be switched
on and off according to individual hardship; allowing relitigation
of choice-of-law issues would only compound the challenge to the
stabilizing purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the
very development of “new” rules. Of course, the generalized
enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the courts to consider,
the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but
similarly situated. Conversely, nothing we say here precludes
consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial
issues in particular cases.51

c. Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
The decision in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
solidifies the opinion in Beam and narrows the possibility of
prospective holdings even more.52 Harper involved a Virginia tax
that was deemed unconstitutional in Davis v. Michigan
Department of Treasury.53 The Virginia Supreme Court struck
down the law in light of the Davis holding, but refused to issue
refunds for taxes that were collected in reliance on the
unconstitutional law because they claimed they could still apply
Chevron Oil in spite of Beam.54 The Virginia Supreme Court
claimed that Davis had made no specific ruling as to whether it
was to be applied retroactively or prospectively, and that Beam
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 540.
Griffith v. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 538.
Id. at 543-544.
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989).
Harper, 509 U.S. at 91-92.
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would only apply if Davis had been applied retroactively.55 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and instead posited that:
When this Court does not reserve the question of whether its
holding should be applied to the parties before it, however, an
opinion is properly understood to have followed the normal rule
of retroactive application and must be read to hold that its rule
should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the
Court.56

The Court restated and solidified the new rule first
addressed in Beam, holding that:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before
it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and
must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such
events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule. . . . In
both civil and criminal cases, we can scarcely permit the
substantive law [to] shift and spring according to the particular
equities of [individual parties’] claims of actual reliance on an old
rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the new rule.57

It is important to note that this case law applies to Supreme
Court decisions and does not reference District Court decisions
such as New Jersey v. EPA or agency actions. However, when
speaking about the Beam decision, the Supreme Court
unequivocally stated “a rule of federal law, once announced and
applied to the parties to the controversy, must be given full
retroactive effect by all courts adjudicating federal law.”58
d. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde
In Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,59 the Supreme Court
addressed an Ohio decision claiming that although a tolling
statute allowing unlimited time to sue for lawsuits against out-ofstate defendants was found unconstitutional in Bendix Autolite
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 97-98 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 97 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 96.
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
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Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.,60 it would still apply to tort
claims “accrued before that decision.”61 The petitioner, Hyde,
argued not that Harper should not apply, but that the decision to
allow the tort claims to continue should be looked at “not through
the lens of retroactivity but through that of remedy,” and that
states have a “degree of legal leeway in fashioning remedies for
constitutional ills.”62 While finding this argument clever, the
Supreme Court did not find it legitimate.63 Hyde pointed to cases
that she thought allowed state courts to avoid retroactivity by
denying a particular remedy. For example, in some tax cases,
states could choose to either give a refund, or impose a back tax
on those who paid disproportionally less as a result of the struck
down rule.64 The Supreme Court clarified the issue, identifying
four circumstances under which a new rule in case law may not
determine the outcome of a pending case to which it is being
applied retroactively:
[A] court may find (1) an alternative way of curing the
constitutional violation, or (2) a previously existing, independent
legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying
relief, or (3) as in the law of qualified immunity, a wellestablished general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law,
which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other
significant policy justifications, or (4) a principle of law, such as
that of “finality” present in the Teague context, that limits the
principle of retroactivity itself.65

Since none of these were claimed by Hyde or applied to the facts
of Hyde, the Court held simply that the Harper ruling applies and
a court cannot escape the retroactive result at the remedial
stage.66

60. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
61. Hyde, 514 U.S. at 750-751.
62. Id. at 752.
63. See generally id. at 752-754 (discussing Hyde’s arguments).
64. Id. at 755.
65. Id. (the Teague doctrine applies to habeas corpus petitioners where the
Court has found that a habeas petitioner cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy
where doing so requires the habeas court to apply retroactively a new rule of
criminal law).
66. Id.
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C. The Circuit Court’s interpretation of retroactivity and
prior reliance on vacated law
The Supreme Court’s opinion of the retroactive effect of its
decisions appears very clear from the above case law. It would be
sensible to apply this general default assumption of retroactivity
to the New Jersey v. EPA decision, especially in light of the fact
that the D.C. Circuit did not hold that the decision should be
applied prospectively, and that selective case-by-case prospective
application has been disallowed.67 However, all of this case law
applies to Supreme Court decisions and to constitutional issues,
not to circuit court holdings and administrative regulations
governed by statute. Since the D.C. Circuit oversaw the matter,
its interpretation is especially relevant when attempting to
determine its intent when vacating CAMR.
a. National Fuel Gas Supply Corp v. F.E.R.C.
The D.C. Circuit addressed both of the above mentioned
concerns in National Fuel Gas Supply Corp v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission.68 At issue here was a Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) order that allowed local
distribution companies (LDCs) to reduce their contractual
commitments to suppliers.69 The order was vacated in American
Gas Distributors v. FERC.70 National Fuel challenged the
retroactive application of this ruling, claiming that they had
relied on the order to reduce their contract and were unfairly
prejudiced by the retroactive effect of the ruling. They could have
taken other actions, such as converting parts of the contract to
cover transportation costs, had they known the order was
invalid.71 FERC initially did a Chevron Oil three-factor analysis
and switched its ruling several times on the retroactive effect.72
It finally determined that the same remedy, “payment to it by
67. See supra Part II-B-b and c.
68. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 59 F.3d
1281 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
69. Id. at 1282.
70. Associated Gas Distrib.v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 824 F.2d 981
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
71. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 59 F.3d at 1286.
72. See id. at 1284-86.
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National Fuel of the full demand charges associated with its CD
reduction” would be required whether the case was viewed under
the “Beam and Harper principles of retroactivity or at the initial
choice-of-law level under the third prong of the Chevron Oil
analysis.”73
The D.C. Circuit came to the same result but by different
reasoning in light of the recent holding in Hyde. It applied Hyde
and summed up the retroactivity analysis surmising that after
Hyde, only the “the most compelling circumstances” would allow a
court to use reliance as a reason to depart from the “norm of
retroactive application.”74 The court concluded that:
[W]hatever the continuing validity of Chevron Oil after [Harper]
and [Hyde], there is not the sort of grave disruption or inequity
involved in awarding retrospective relief to this petitioner that
would bring that doctrine into play.”). Hence, if Harper is
applicable here, then we do not need to consider whether the
Commission properly applied Chevron Oil; we need only consider
whether any of the four circumstances identified in Hyde might
apply here.75

The court furthered its decision by applying the holdings on
retroactivity to agencies as well. In its reasoning, the court could
find no rationale for why such decisions and their logic would
apply to judicial decisions and not agencies.76 In explaining this
decision, the court discussed why an Article III court decision77
should be given a retroactive effect:
Because the decision of an Article III court, however, announces
the law as though [it] were finding it discerning what the law is,
rather than decreeing what it is . . . changed to, or what it will
tomorrow be, all parties charged with applying that decision,
whether agency or court, state or federal, must treat it as if it
had always been the law. The agency must give retroactive effect

73. Id. at 1286.
74. Id. at 1288.
75. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
76. Id. at 1289 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
77. An Article III court decision refers to a decision made by a judicial body
established by Article III of the U. S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
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to the ruling of a federal court because of the nature of that
court.78

The court then compared this reasoning to the reasoning barring
an Article III court from applying an advisory decision or one that
does not apply evenly and justly to all citizens but singles
individuals out discriminately.79 The court concluded that “[i]n
sum, the decision of a federal court must be given retroactive effect
regardless whether it is being applied by a court or an agency.”80
Finally, the D.C. Circuit established that the reliance issue
and factors of Chevron Oil were not to be considered, stating:
National seeks an evidentiary hearing so that it can present
evidence in support of its arguments about reliance. Even if
National were able to show that it relied to its detriment upon
the CD reduction provision, however, the Commission would not
have the discretion to deny Tennessee the remedy of retroactive
vacatur of National’s CD reduction. Therefore, we need not
consider whether the Commission erred by refusing to hold a
hearing.81

b. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA and United States v. Goodner
Bros. Aircraft, Inc.
Shell Oil Co. v. EPA82 and United States v. Goodner Bros.
Aircraft, Inc.83 occurred prior to the Harper and Hyde decisions.
However, they rely on Beam, and provide an example of the
process when a rule that was relied upon is vacated and then
action is taken following the vacation of the rule. In Shell Oil,
the court vacated the “mixture rule” promulgated by EPA in its
regulations under RCRA; the “mixture rule” had been considered
valid law for almost ten years.84 The D.C. Circuit stated “we

78. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 59 F.3d at 1289 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1290-91.
82. Shell Oil Co v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
83. United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir.
1992).
84. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d at 765.
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vacate these rules and remand them to the agency.”85 In New
Jersey v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit used similar language to vacate
CAMR by holding that “the court must vacate CAMR’s new
source performance standards and remand them to EPA for
reconsideration.”86 Neither ruling expresses an opinion on the
retroactive effect of the vacation. However, following the Shell
ruling, the defendants in Goodner appealed to overturn their
conviction for RCRA violations, since the conviction had been
based in part on the vacated “mixture rule.”87
The Eighth Circuit directly addressed the question of
whether the vacation of the rule would subject prior actions (that
relied upon the rule) to reversal and invalidity due to the
retroactivity of the Shell decision, despite the fact that the D.C.
Circuit did not directly address this matter in its holding in Shell.
The court stated in its analysis of this issue that:
Under James B. Beam Distilling, full retroactive effect must be
given to a new rule of civil law when the new rule is applied to
the litigants in the case in which the rule was announced. The
court in Shell Oil did not expressly reserve the question of
retroactivity or of whether its holding should apply to the parties
before it. On the contrary, it declined to reach the substantive
arguments of the petitioner regarding the mixture rule because it
had vacated the mixture rule. If the court had not applied the
invalidation of the mixture rule to the parties before it, it would
have been required to reach the substantive arguments. Under
James B. Beam Distilling and consistent with the meaning of the
word “vacate,” we find that invalidation of the mixture rule
applies retroactively.88

Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in New Jersey v. EPA did not reach the
other arguments of the petitioners because they had vacated the
rule and further analysis was moot.89 The Goodner court
concluded that “[b]ased upon the invalidation of the federal
mixture rule, we reverse the district court and remand so that the
verdicts on counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 may be set aside and a new trial

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 384-85.
Id. at 385 (internal citations omitted).
New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 584.
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held.”90 This analysis could be applied directly to the EGUs
permitted post-CAMR and prior to CAMR being vacated.
Further arguments were not addressed in Shell Oil because
the rule was vacated. The Eighth Circuit in Goodner found that
the Shell Oil vacation by the D.C. Circuit had retroactive effects
and overturned prior convictions that relied on the vacated
regulation.91 The D.C. Circuit also vacated CAMR, and again
made no analysis of the further claims due to the vacation of the
regulation, and again made no statement to the retroactivity of
the decision.
In addition, the Supreme Court has since
strengthened the presumption of retroactivity in Harper and
Hyde. Thus, it appears given these circumstances there is a very
strong argument that the D.C. Circuit intended the effects of
vacating CAMR to be retroactive regardless of any reliance upon
it.
D. Other Sources on Judicial Administrative Remedies:
As discussed, there is very little in the way of scholarly works
regarding available judicial remedies and their effect when a
court finds an agency regulation unlawful.92 There is even less
regarding the specific topic at hand, the retroactive nature of a
vacatur of such regulations. While there are ample articles and
case law regarding the legality of promulgating regulations with
a retroactive effect, this topic is separate from the matter at
hand, concerning whether a vacatur will jeopardize actions in the
past that relied upon the now-nonexistent regulations. Despite
this void, there are a few works that address aspects of the topic
and help to shed light on the subject, including potential options a
court has when reviewing agency actions. The works discussed
below focus on the emergence of the court’s option to remand
without vacatur, a practice which is examined further in detail
below.93
In Vacation at Sea, Ronald Levin explores the purpose, and
the historical use of remand without vacatur, ultimately
concluding that the practice is a beneficial remedy for the courts
90.
91.
92.
93.

Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 385.
Id.
Levin, supra note 1, at 293-94.
See infra Part II-E.
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to implement.94 Levin describes remand without vacatur as “[a]
court’s decision, after full consideration, to pronounce an agency
action illegal, but to allow the action to continue in effect
anyway.”95 Levin examines the legality of remand without
vacatur within the confines of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),96 and also looks at what objections to the practice may be
raised.97 Most notably, Levin addresses the “rise of retroactivity
in judicial decisions” as a justification for remand without
vacatur, stating:
[e]ven if the Supreme Court were to extend its ‘retroactivity of
judicial holdings’ case law to its logical terminus by overruling
Chevron Oil completely, appellate practice in regulatory contexts
might not be affected very profoundly because prospective-only
judicial decisions have not been very common in administrative
cases anyway.98

Levin concludes that remand without vacatur “has enabled the
courts to temper their relief in administrative cases so as to avoid
disruptions, effect [sic] smooth transitions, and maintain the
continuity of regulatory measures that protect the public.”99
In Remanding without Vacating Agency Action, Brian Prestes
follows the historical rise of remand without vacatur as an
alternative to vacating regulations.100 Prestes describes the
rationale for this shift in standard as follows:
Because agencies tackle complex problems and because agency
action can be challenged in many ways and from many
directions, proponents argue that agencies should be permitted to
present new evidence responding to challengers’ attacks when it
appears that the agency could likely do so when the adverse
consequences of vacation are likely to be significant.101

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See generally Levin, supra note 1.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 305-15.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 385-86.
See Brian S. Prestes, Remanding without Vacating Agency Action, 32
SETON HALL L. REV. 108, 111-15 (2001).
101. Id. at 123.
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Prestes also discusses the controversial legal authority behind
remand without vacatur and the history of the APA, before
concluding, opposite to Levin, that the practice is unlawful,
stating: “the text of the APA, along with the legislative history,
statutory purpose, canons of construction, and judicial precedent
demonstrate the illegality of remanding without vacating.”102
In We’ve Only Just Begun, Daniel Rodriguez again examines
judicial administrative remedies from the viewpoint of the
emergence of remand without vacatur.103 Rodriguez points to the
pros and cons of the new remedy created by the judiciary,
pointing to less damage done by the ruling as a positive, and
increased judicial activism as a negative.104 Rodriguez discusses
the effects of vacatur of agency regulations in his work, stating:
“[v]acatur, on its own terms, has no necessary connection to the
remedy of remand. Vacatur obliterates the agency decision.”105
While Rodriguez acknowledges the problematic effects of vacatur,
he ultimately concludes that the development and use of remand
without vacatur in its place is potentially as problematic.106
In An Article I, Section 7 Perspective on Administrative Law
Remedies, Boris Bershteyn uses game theory to analyze the
different remedies available when reviewing administrative
agency actions.107 Bershteyn argues in favor of vacating agency
regulations and against remand without vacatur as a remedy;
because the former would force Congress to legislate with
increased specificity, and as shown through game theory models
this is a desirable effect.108 In his analysis Bershteyn discusses
how a bar on the promulgation of retroactive rulemaking, unless
explicitly authorized, has pushed the courts towards remand
without vacatur; ultimately he concludes that the fears that
pushed courts towards that remedy are unfounded, stating that
102. Id. at 151.
103. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, We’ve Only Just Begun: The Impact of
Remand Orders From Higher to Lower Courts on American Jurisprudence: Of
Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in
Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 (2004).
104. Id. at 635-37.
105. Id. at 611.
106. Id. at 635-37.
107. See generally Boris Bershteyn, An Article I, Section 7 Perspective on
Administrative Law Remedies, 114 YALE. L.J. 359 (2004).
108. Id. at 404.
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“the main risk of vacating the rule is not an overly disruptive
default policy, but an insufficiently responsive legislature.”109
While much of the literature on administrative remedies
surrounds remand without vacatur and does not directly address
the issue at hand, much can be implicitly gained from these
analyses. First, the authors all acknowledge the disruptive effect
of vacating a regulation. Second, the practice, while disputed, is
clearly established. Third, as discussed in the next section,
although the option was available to them, the D.C. Circuit chose
not remand without vacatur but to vacate CAMR entirely in New
Jersey v. EPA.
E. D.C. Circuit had other available options than to Vacate
The case law analysis above110 is strengthened by the fact
that the D.C. Circuit had other options to settle the case and
avoid retroactivity, had it not intended a vacation of CAMR to
have a retroactive effect. The court could have ruled that the
decision applied prospectively, thus negating the default of
retroactivity. The court also could have withheld the issuance of
its mandate to allow problems presented by the vacatur to be
sorted out.111
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit itself has developed a
procedure known as “remand without vacatur”—discussed in
much of the literature above112 —to avoid the issues involved in
vacating a regulation and its retroactive effect. The D.C. Circuit
first applied this approach in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.113 It identified the criteria to apply this
device instead of vacating, stating that it “depends on [1] the
109. Id. at 309.
110. See supra Part II-B and C.
111. See Indep. U.S Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“[w]e vacate the rule because the Secretary's omissions are quite serious
and raise considerable doubt about which of the proposed alternatives would
best serve the objectives set out in the Merchant Marine Act. Yet we exercise
our power to withhold issuance of our mandate until July 16, 1987, to avoid
further disruptions in the domestic market and to allow the Secretary to
undertake further proceedings to address the problems of the merchant marine
trade.”).
112. See supra Part II-D.
113. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 146
(D.C. Cir. 1993).

23

24

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of
doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive
consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.”114
The fact that the D.C. Circuit decided not to employ these
numerous other options at its disposal is further evidence that it
intended the vacation of CAMR to have retroactive results. The
D.C. Circuit case law shows that it is well aware of the issues
involved and the disruptive effects when a rule is vacated. The
reasoning of its decisions to remand without vacatur frequently
indicates that the court did not solely vacate specifically in order
to avoid these effects, an option they did not exercise in New
Jersey v. EPA.115
Finally, in certain cases, the D.C. Circuit has used remand
without vacatur instead of vacatur in instances where the
retroactivity of a vacation results in remedies that cannot be
satisfied due to past actions. The court stated that the “egg has
been scrambled,” implying that it cannot be unscrambled as a
remedy; vacation is therefore inappropriate, because courts would

114. Id. at 150-151.
115. See A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(“[a]lthough, on this record, we are unable to conclude that the FDA's approval
of Philips Roxane's application was not arbitrary and capricious, we are not
required to vacate the approval . . . In this case, the FDA may well be able to
explain why it reasonably determined that the Prescott Study demonstrated
bioequivalency. In addition, vacating the rule approving the NADA would prove
disruptive to Philips Roxane, which has relied on it in good faith for over
thirteen years.”); see also Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine
Safety and Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Relevant to the
choice are the seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and thus the extent of
doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an
interim change that may itself be changed . . . The record before us does not
appear to speak to the effects of an interim change—except in the sense that
those effects include the safety effects of the order itself (and thus its
substantive validity). As the record affords us no basis for concluding that the
deficiencies of the order will prove substantively fatal, we remand the case but
do not vacate.”); see also Md. Native Plant Soc’y v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
332 F. Supp. 2d 845, 863 (D. Md. 2004) (“Moreover, vacatur at this juncture
would have a serious economic impact on the developer. As attested by Hunters
Brooke LLC's general partner, Mohammed Tobah, the partnership stands to
lose hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not more, if the uncertainty of a vacatur
is introduced, even though the Corps may eventually be able to articulate
sustainable reasons for its decision.”).
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be forced to fashion remedies or damages due to the retroactive
nature of vacating the regulation.116
These cases are of particular relevance because they show
that not only does the D.C. Circuit think of the potential effect of
vacating before deciding to do so, but it is also aware of the
possibility that a remedy may not be available due to prior
reliance, and in such circumstances has chosen to remand
without vacatur rather than vacate the rule. The inference then
would be that by vacating a regulation, the D.C. Circuit intended
the vacatur to have retroactive effects and did not feel that the
‘egg had been scrambled,’ so to speak.
This retroactivity analysis can be applied to EGUs permitted
under CAMR prior to New Jersey v. EPA as an example of the
types of serious issues that the vacatur of agency regulations will
affect. In cases where the EGU has finished construction or no
change can be made to the projected mercury and HAP emissions
without a significant overhaul, it is conceivable that the courts
may find no such remedy available; the egg may be scrambled in
this situation. However, given the time it takes to construct a
typical EGU,117 and the timing of the New Jersey v. EPA decision
with respect to the promulgation of CAMR (a little more than two
years passed between the two), it does not appear likely that
many plants, if any, would be beyond this point of no return in
116. See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97-98
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Normally when an agency so clearly violates the APA we
would vacate its action—in this case its “non-rule rule”—and simply remand for
the agency to start again. Unfortunately, because we denied preliminary relief
in this case, the 2001 program was launched and crops were plowed under. The
egg has been scrambled and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo
ante. Appellants suggested that if we were to vacate, the Federal Court of
Claims would have the responsibility of allocating damages.”); Milk Train, Inc.
v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“As in Sugar Cane Growers
Coop. where the Secretary had improperly disbursed large quantities of sugar to
farmers across the country, who in turn had already plowed under their crops,
the Secretary here has already disbursed the 1999 program moneys [sic] to
numerous dairy producers throughout the country, and those moneys [sic] may
not be recoverable three years later. Here, as there, the egg has been scrambled
and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo ante.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
117. For example, according to Duke Energy, it began constructing the
Cliffside Power Plant in January 2008, and Cliffside is not expected to be online
until 2012. See Cliffside Steam Station Project Overview, DUKE ENERGY,
http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/cliffside-overview.asp (last visited Nov.
21, 2011).
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their construction. To further understand the application of this
analysis to the particulars of HAP emissions regulation, mercury
in particular, and the implications of the vacatur of CAMR, it is
important to first understand why mercury regulation is
important and its history, then second, the ruling vacating CAMR
in New Jersey v. EPA.
III. MERCURY 101
The main type of mercury discussed in this article and
emitted from EGUs is methylmercury. Methylmercury affects
neurological development and presents several health risks,
particularly in a fetus or young child.118 Methylmercury poses a
health hazard when ingested by pregnant women or by mothers
with breastfeeding babies.119 The EPA states, “[i]t is estimated
that more than 300,000 newborns each year may have increased
risk of learning disabilities associated with in utero exposure to
methylmercury.”120
Mercury emitted from power plants is
deposited in lakes and oceans where it transforms into
methylmercury. It then bioaccumulates (moves itself up the food
chain) into large fish. Ingestion of fish is the primary method of
human contact with methylmercury.121 The public health risks
posed by mercury are well established and very serious.
Mercury regulation in the United States, despite its recent
notoriety and established risks, is in its infancy. Mercury first
gained major attention in the environmental community with the
release of an EPA Mercury Study Report in 1997, a study
required by the amendments to the CAA of 1990.122 In December
of 2000, the EPA listed EGUs under section 112 of the CAA. This
listing required that HAPs, including mercury, emitted from
these sources must be regulated with a MACT approach.123 Five
years later, the EPA adopted CAMR on March 15, 2005 “to
permanently cap and reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired

118. See Mercury: Human Exposure, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/
exposure.htm#meth (last updated Oct. 1, 2010).
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. U.S. EPA, MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-1 (1997).
123. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B).
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power plants for the first time ever.”124 CAMR sparked intense
debate between industry, which praised the rule for its flexibility
and lack of economic impact, and environmentalists, who believed
that the rule was not nearly strict enough, catered to big
business, and was politically motivated.125
CAMR was implemented under section 111 of the CAA.126
This shifted mercury regulation to a cap and trade based
regulatory scheme that alloted maximum amounts of mercury
emissions to the states and tribes that regulate it.127 The
additional effect of adopting CAMR was that in order to
implement it, EPA first delisted EGUs from section 112 of the
CAA, thus no longer requiring a MACT analysis to be completed
prior to construction of any new major source or modification to
EGUs.128 Under CAMR, the states and tribes were required to
submit a report on their plan for distribution of the credits.
Additionally, the credits could have been bought and sold
between the plants, and excess credits could be saved for later
use, so-called “banking.”129 The EPA claimed that when fully
implemented, the proposed caps would have resulted in a
decrease in mercury emissions by seventy percent.130 In addition
to the initial cap, another cap would have been imposed in 2018;
“new” power plants (those beginning construction after January
30, 2004) would have been held to “stringent” performance
standards as well as adherence to the caps.131
Much of the criticism of CAMR concerned the switch from
using section 112 to using section 111 for HAPs regulation from
EGUs.
This change fueled the perception that the Bush
Administration favored business interests over the environment

124. Clean Air Mercury Rule, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/CAMR/ (last
updated Mar. 16, 2011).
125. Lauren Parry, Clean Air Rules of 2004: Motivation, Impacts, and
Concerns, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 367, 390 (2005).
126. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
127. Parry, supra note 125.
128. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
129. N.C. DEP’T OF ENV’T AND NATural RES., DIV. OF AIR QUALITY, MERCURY
EMISSIONS & MERCURY CONTROLS FOR COAL-FIRED ELECTRICAL UTIL. BOILERS II13 (2005) [hereinafter NCDENR].
130. Clean
Air
Mercury
Rule:
Basic
Information,
U.S.
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/camr/basic.html (last updated March 16, 2011).
131. Id.
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when crafting the rule.132 The regulations were generally wellreceived by business because of the flexibility afforded them in a
cap and trade system regulated by the states.133 While it is true
that a cap and trade system might reduce mercury emissions
nationally, environmentalists pointed to the fact that, unlike
carbon and global warming for instance, mercury and other HAPs
have very localized effects on the surrounding community.134
Thus, a cap and trade system for regulating mercury would allow
“hot spots” to develop where risks would be increased, and could
also present several environmental justice issues.135
Another concern is that the EPA may not have duly
considered the risk to outlier populations, such as several Native
American populations, that consume much higher than average
amounts of fish in their daily diets. The acceptable mercury
emissions level established by EPA was based on an average
person’s consumption of fish. Thus, communities that rely
heavily on fish in their diets may be more susceptible to the risks
posed by mercury emissions that have made their way into native
fish.136
An additional criticism of the 2005 CAMR lies in the “race to
the bottom” theory.137 Since the regulations in the cap and trade
system, unlike applying MACT, are on a state-by-state basis, not
all states are subject to them. States that have extra emissions
credits or are not required to adhere to the regulations might be
enticed to recruit business based on their less stringent
requirements.138
Some states took action to refine EPA mercury emissions
standards. For example, North Carolina went through the

132. Parry, supra note 125, at 385.
133. Id.
134. See Press Release, Dartmouth News, New Studies Link Mercury
Pollution Hotspots to U.S. Coal-fired Power Plants and Other Sources (Jan. 9,
2007), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~news/releases/2007/01/09.html.
A map of mercury hot spots in North America is available at
http://www.cec.org/Storage/49/4186_hotspots_en.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Catherine A. O’Neil, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards,
Contaminated Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 3, 9 (2000).
137. Parry, supra note 125, at 392.
138. Id. at 391.
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process of developing its own supplementary mercury regulations
to be used in addition to the CAMR. The Department of Air
Quality in North Carolina completed its Mercury Emissions and
Mercury Controls for Coal-fired Electrical Utility Boilers report on
September 1, 2005. The stated goals of the report were to:
(1) update issues related to monitoring and controlling mercury
emissions from coal-fired generating units, (2) update control
technology information, (3) provide estimates of cost to benefits of
alternative strategies to reduce emissions of mercury, and (4)
provide a recommendation to reduce the emission of mercury
from coal-fired generating units.139

The North Carolina report, which states that the North Carolina
regulations are under formation by the Environmental
Management Commission, provides an in-depth comparison
between the cap and trade system favored by the EPA and the
Bush Administration, and the MACT method favored by
environmentalists as well as several states. The report points out
that both the flexibility and extra time provided by cap and trade
to upgrade, and its trade policy, are benefits; however, the ability
to “bank” credits may result in higher outputs in later years.140
MACT, in the eyes of North Carolina, would provide more
stringent regulations but might hinder smaller businesses that
cannot afford the upgrades and would thus be hurt when no
emissions trading is allowed.141 The conclusion of the report is
that North Carolina should pursue a policy that “is at least as
stringent as the CAMR and that also meets any additional
requirements that the Environmental Management Commission
deems appropriate for North Carolina.”142
Not all states and organizations responded as open-mindedly
to CAMR as North Carolina. According to the North Carolina
report:
[s]election of Section 111 instead of Section 112 has resulted in
ten states filing a lawsuit challenging EPA’s decision to revise its
December 2000 regulatory finding that removed coal- and oil139.
140.
141.
142.

NCDENR, supra note 129, at iv.
Id. at II-14.
Id. at II-14.
Id. at V-1.
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fired electric utility steam generating units from the Section
112(c) source category list. EPA’s revision rescinds the findings
made in 2000 for utility air toxics that supported a requirement
that utilities should install MACT, defined under the Clean Air
Act. Four environmental groups have petitioned EPA to stay the
revised regulatory determination pending the outcome of the
states’ legal challenge.143

While no stays were granted, the state lawsuits were heard and
consolidated in New Jersey v. EPA. This is discussed in detail in
the next section of this article.
IV. THE HOLDING OF NEW JERSEY V. EPA
New Jersey v. EPA presents a holding that fits the analysis of
the retroactive effect of vacating agency regulations perfectly. If
the court were to vacate CAMR when they examined it, several
potential issues of retroactivity would need to be resolved,
especially if the holding were to be applied to coal-burning power
plants permitted during the time period prior to the holding of
the case. The New Jersey v. EPA decision can be viewed in two
parts. First, the court needed to decide if the delisting of EGUs
from section 112 of the CAA was legal. Second, if the court found
that the delisting was illegal, then it would need to determine
what effect, if any, this holding would have on the recent addition
of EGU regulation under section 111, i.e. the cap and trade
program implemented by CAMR.144
To answer the first question, the court examined the
arguments of both the petitioners and the defendants. The
petitioners claimed that in order to delist EGUs from Section 112,
the EPA was required to follow the procedures set forth in Section
112(c)(9) of the CAA.145 Section 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) states that to
delist a source category from section 112, the EPA must
determine that “that emissions from no source in the category or
subcategory concerned . . . exceed a level which is adequate to
protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no
adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from any

143. Id. at II-12.
144. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
145. Id. at 577.
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source[.]”146 The petitioners claimed that EPA had failed to
follow this procedure and therefore the delisting was illegal; as
the court noted several times, the EPA made no claim they had
followed this procedure.147
Instead, the EPA made several arguments as to why it was
not required to follow the procedures set out in section 112(c)(9)
when delisting EGUs from regulation under section 112. EPA
attempted to reach the Chevron step two level of deference for its
interpretation of the statute by arguing that if under section
112(n)(1)148 it found that EGUs should not be regulated under
section 112, then section 112(c)(9) becomes ambiguous.149
According to EPA, if section 112(c)(9) was ambiguous, EPA should
be granted the Chevron level of heightened deference in its
interpretation of the statute, 150 meaning that the interpretation
not need be what the court interprets the statute to mean,
instead it must only be a reasonable interpretation. The court
dismissed this argument, noting that:
[S]ection 112(n)(1) governs how the Administrator decides
whether to list EGUs; it says nothing about delisting EGUs, and
the plain text of section 112(c)(9) specifies that it applies to the
delisting of “any source.” In the context of the CAA, “the word
‘any’ has an expansive meaning.” Moreover, where Congress
wished to exempt EGUs from specific requirements of section
112, it said so explicitly. For example, section 112(c)(6) expressly
exempts EGUs from the strict deadlines imposed on other
sources of certain pollutants. Furthermore, EPA concedes that
listing EGUs under section 112(c) triggered application of some
subparts of section 112, but provides no persuasive rationale for
why the comprehensive delisting process of section 112(c)(9) does
not also apply.151

The court found that EPA was not entitled to the high degree of
deference granted to an agency at step two of the Chevron

146. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii).
147. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 581-582.
148. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1).
149. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
150. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582.
151. Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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analysis. Rather, the court held that the question posed was
specifically addressed by the statute, thus barring EPA from
advancing beyond step one in a Chevron analysis.152
The EPA’s second argument for not following the section
112(c)(9) procedure was that an agency has an “inherent
authority to reverse an earlier administrative determination or
ruling where an agency has a principled basis for doing so.”153
The court quickly disregarded this claim by noting that while
such an authority is generally given to an agency to reverse an
earlier agency decision, Congress has the power to limit this
authority, and EPA cannot nullify this Congressional power.154
The court stated:
EPA may not construe [a] statute in a way that completely
nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit its
discretion.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 485
(2001) . . . Indeed, EPA’s position would nullify section 112(c)(9)
altogether, not just with regard to EGUs, for EPA is unable to
explain how, if it were allowed to remove EGUs from the section
112 list without regard to section 112(c)(9), it would not also have
the authority to remove any other source by ignoring the
statutory delisting process.155

Finally, the EPA argued that it has previously delisted other
sources from regulation under section 112 without following the
procedure set forth in section 112(c)(9); therefore, it should be
able to do so in the case at hand for EGUs.156 The court quickly
dismissed this argument because “previous statutory violations
cannot excuse the one now before the court.”157 Thus, since the
procedures in section 112(c)(9) were not followed and EPA
presented no persuasive argument as to why they need not be
followed, the court vacated the delisting of EGUs from section 112
of the CAA.158

152. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583; see also Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-43.
153. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582 (citing Respondent’s Brief at 22) (internal
citations omitted).
154. Id. at 582.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 583.
158. Id.
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Having held that the delisting was illegal, the court needed
to analyze what effect, if any, this holding would have on the
recent CAMR EGU regulations promulgated under section 111 of
the CAA. The court, in its analysis of this question, relied on the
EPA’s own interpretation of the CAA.159 This interpretation
stated that a source regulated under section 112 could not
concurrently be regulated under section 111.160 Relying on this
principle, the court vacated CAMR since it was promulgated on
the assumption that there would be no section 112 regulation of
EGUs. The court stated:
[g]iven that these vital assumptions were incorrect, the court
must vacate CAMR’s new source performance standards and
remand them to EPA for reconsideration, for severance and
affirmance of a portion of an administrative regulation is
improper if there is ‘substantial doubt’ that the agency would
have adopted the severed portion on its own.161

The court leaves no doubt that it has vacated both the delisting of
EGUs from section 112 and the subsequent CAMR regulations
under section 111. However, it does not address the implications
of this vacatur, especially with regard to EGUs permitted during
the time window in which section 112 was not applicable, and
CAMR was considered governing law. To examine the effects of
the vacatur and its potential retroactive application as discussed
in Section II, it is helpful to examine another case stemming from
this decision which seeks to apply its ruling to a coal-burning
power plant retroactively.
V. THE CLIFFSIDE POWER PLANT
A. Background
Duke Energy was permitted by the North Carolina
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR)
on January 29, 2008 to construct the Cliffside Plant, an 800
megawatt coal-burning power plant, outside of Rutherfordton,
159. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 583-84 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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N.C.162 Duke states that it began construction on the Cliffside
plant on January 30, 2008,163 nine days before the February 8,
2008, decision in New Jersey v. EPA. Thus, according to Duke,
section 112 of the CAA requiring it to conduct a MACT analysis
for mercury and other HAPs does not apply to its construction of
the Cliffside plant.164 A lawsuit filed in the federal court’s
Western District of North Carolina claimed not that Duke’s
permit was invalid, but that by not completing a MACT analysis
and continuing construction, Duke was in direct violation of
section 112 of the CAA.165
The Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and Sierra Club first gave
notice of their suit to Duke Energy in a letter dated May 6,
2008.166
The letter stated that, by continuing ongoing
construction without having conducted a MACT analysis, Duke
was in violation of section 112(g)(2)(B).
Section 112(g)(2)(B)
prohibits “contruct[ing]. . . any major source of [HAPs] unless the
Administrator (or the State) determines that [MACT] emission
limitation under this section for new sources will be met.”167
Where no specific limitations have been established, as is the case
for mercury, MACT “shall be made on a case by case basis.”168
Section 304 of the CAA authorizes the authority for such a citizen
suit against Duke.169

162. See Duke Cliffside Permits, N.C. DEP’T ENV’T & NATURAL RES. DIV. OF AIR
QUALITY (July 2, 2009, 11:03 AM), http://daq.state.nc.us/permits/psd/
cliffside.shtml.
163. Letter from John Suttles, S. Envtl. Law Ctr., to Rick Roper, Manager,
Cliffside Steam Station, Duke Energy (May 6, 2008) (on file with author).
164. See Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No.
108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008). This argument is
reminiscent of that made by Tennessee Valley Authority in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill. The Supreme Court invalidated the argument in that case;
however, that case dealt with a statute of Congress applying not a judicial
vacatur of an agency regulation. See also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 157-160 (1978).
165. See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No.
1:08CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008).
166. Letter from John Suttles, supra note 163.
167. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B).
168. Id.
169. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
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NCDENR was obviously unsure of the implications of the
holding in New Jersey v. EPA on the Cliffside Plant. In a letter to
Duke, dated June 2, 2008, NCDENR acknowledged that any
plant now applying for a permit would be subject to the section
112 requirements; however, “there is a debate whether a major
source whose construction was permitted and begun prior to the
D.C. Circuit’s decision and mandate, but whose construction will
be completed for the most part after the date of mandate, is
subject to the requirements of § 112(g).”170 The letter then
encourages Duke to engage in a “public process” to determine the
“maximum degree of reduction in emissions of HAPs”
achievable.171 In response, Duke agreed to undergo a voluntary
“MACT-like” process, but maintained that section 112(g) did not
apply to them.172 While on its face this may seem as if the
statute is being followed, the petitioners claimed that a “MACTlike” voluntary process is no substitute for the statutory
requirements of an actual MACT assessment, which involves
public hearings and studies, and that section 112(g) did indeed
apply to the Cliffside Plant. Thus, two main questions were in
need of answer in the suit: does section 112(g) apply to the
Cliffside plant; and if it does, what is the proper remedy?

170. Letter from Keith Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dep’t of Env’t
and Natural Res., to Rick Roper, Manager, Cliffside Steam Station, Duke
Energy (Jun. 2, 2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/permits/psd/docs/
cliffside/Letter_Regarding_Cliffside_MACTs.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Letter from James L. Turner, President and Chief Operating Officer, U.S.
Franchised Elec. & Gas, to Keith Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dept.
of Env’t & Natural Res. (July 3, 2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/
permits/psd/docs/cliffside/Cover_Letter.pdf. See also DUKE ENERGY, CASE-BYCASE MACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAPS, UNIT NO. 6 CLIFFSIDE STEAM STATION
PROJECT 3-4 (2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/permits/psd/docs/cliffside/
Case-by-Case_MACT_Assessment-Final_07-03-08.pdf (presenting the results of
Duke’s self- assessment of MACT for the Cliffside plane and asserting that
MACT does not necessarily apply to the Cliffside plant); see also Reply Brief in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability and Standing
at 11-12, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ.
108CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 53951 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 8, 2008)
(Discussing the differences between a “MACT-like” process conducted by Duke
and a formal MACT analysis governed by section 112 of the CAA) [hereinafter
Reply to Summary Judgment, S. Alliance for Clean Energy].
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B. Petitioners’ Argument
The petitioners’ claims that Duke must apply MACT for
mercury and other HAPs to the Cliffside plant can be broken
down into a three-part analysis. First, despite the fact that
section 112(g) is a preconstruction requirement, it still applies to
the Cliffside plant post-construction commencement.173 Second,
by vacating CAMR, section 112 retroactively applies to the
Cliffside plant.174 Finally, because section 112 applies, Duke is
required to conduct a formal MACT analysis; otherwise they are
in violation of the CAA.175 For the purposes of this article, the
second argument is by far the most relevant.
The petitioners rely heavily upon the language used by the
D.C. Circuit in New Jersey v. EPA to refute Duke’s claim that the
holding ‘reinstated’ EGUs to be listed under section 112, pointing
to the language used that “EGUs remain listed under section
112.”176 Additionally, the petitioners address the case law
discussed above. The petitioners assert that judicial decisions
should apply retroactively in regards to vacatur of agency
regulations; in particular, they point to the National Fuel case as
an example where the default presumption of a ruling against an
agency regulation would be retroactive application.177
C. Duke’s Argument
Duke’s argument is not that they have complied with section
112 of the CAA. Instead, Duke claims that the section should not
apply to them at all in regards to the Cliffside plant.178 Duke’s
argument that section 112 does not apply to the Cliffside plant
can be broken into two primary parts. First, Duke claims that
section 112 should not apply to the Cliffside plant because the

173. Reply to Summary Judgment, S. Alliance for Clean Energy, supra note
172, at 6-9.
174. Id. at 9-15.
175. Id. at 15-17.
176. Id. at 10; see also New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
177. Reply to Summary Judgment, S. Alliance for Clean Energy, supra note
172, at 11-15.
178. Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss at 3-14, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
No. Civ. 108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008).
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relevant regulations do not apply to ongoing construction, but
only to the commencement of construction, which Duke claims to
have commenced prior to New Jersey v. EPA.179 Second, Duke
claims that the courts cannot apply section 112(g) retroactively in
this case.180 This second argument is most relevant to this
article.181
To argue that the court cannot apply section 112(g) and the
ruling in New Jersey v. EPA retroactively, Duke makes a series of
claims: (1) that to do so the court would be expanding the holding
of New Jersey v. EPA; (2) that to do so would ignore the laws
against retroactive imposition of liability; and (3) that case law
asserts that an agency cannot make retroactive regulations
without violating due process and by applying the holding of New
Jersey v. EPA, the courts would be doing just that.182
To support this argument, Duke relies primarily on two
cases, Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital and Landgraf v.
USI Film Products.183 Duke claims that applying section 112(g)
to the Cliffside plant “represents a retroactive application of
statutory and regulatory provisions, not a judicial decision”184 by
relying on their assertion that New Jersey v. EPA reinstated
EGUs to be listed under section 112(g) rather than affirmed that
they remain listed, and Bowen, holding that an agency must
make prospective regulations.185
Additionally, Duke discounts the petitioners’ reading of
National Fuel, stating that it “does not even represent a straight-

179. Id. at 3-5.
180. Id. at 5-14.
181. In addition, Duke claimed that the petitioners lacked proper standing to
bring suit, and that the suit was a collateral attack on the state’s permitting
process. Since neither argument is relevant to the analysis in this article and
neither was successful, these arguments are not discussed at length in the
discussion of Duke’s Motion to Dismiss. See id. at 14-25. See also S. Alliance for
Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ. 108CV318, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008).
182. Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss at 14-25, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
No. Civ. 108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008) [hereinafter
Reply to Motion to Dismiss, S. Alliance for Clean Energy].
183. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
184. Reply to Motion to Dismiss, S. Alliance for Clean Energy, supra note 182,
at 10.
185. Id.
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forward application of the judicial retroactivity doctrine, because
the remedy . . . would have largely prospective effects.”186
Instead, Duke relies on Landgraf and states that the “restriction
on retroactivity Due Process imposes constrains all branches of
the government, not just the legislative and executive.”187 Duke
surmises its argument that section 112(g) cannot be applied to
the Cliffside plant retroactively, again relying on the case law
decisions that agencies cannot make retroactive regulations, and
that finding for the petitioners in this case would be analogous to
the judiciary doing just that as a surrogate of the agency claiming
that “[j]udicial retroactivity cannot create liability for following
then existing law.”188
D. The Holding
On December 2, 2008, the Western District of North Carolina
published the holding of SACE v. Duke Energy. The court
granted the motion for summary judgment by the petitioners, and
ordered that Duke complete the MACT analysis for mercury and
other HAPs in sixty days or face a court-ordered injunction for
ongoing construction of the Cliffside plant.189 The court contends
that “the main issue to be decided in this case . . . [is] whether or
not the requirements of Section 112(g)(2)(B) apply to the ongoing
construction of Unit 6.”190 To reach a decision, the court cited
National Fuel, Harper, and Beam to assert that when the D.C.
Circuit vacated CAMR the effect of that holding was “that EGUs,
including Defendant, remain listed under § 112 and subject to its
provision. This Court concludes that § 112(g)(2)(B) and 40 C.F.R.
§ 63.40(b) were in effect at the time Duke began its construction
of Cliffside Unit 6 and the completion of the MACT process was
required before construction began.”191 Clearly, at least in the

186. Id. at 13.
187. Id. at 12; see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265.
188. Id. at 16.
189. S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ.
108CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485, at *23-24 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008).
190. Id. at 5.
191. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). It should be noted that despite this ruling,
Duke Energy has yet to begin the MACT analysis. Duke now claims that they
never should have been subject to section 112(g) in the first place, and they now
contend that the Cliffside plant is not a “major source” under the statute,
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case of the Western District of North Carolina, the court has held
that the decision in New Jersey v. EPA should apply retroactively,
forcing EGUs permitted while CAMR was considered valid law to
conduct the MACT analysis for mercury and other HAPs with the
same force as if it had always been the law and CAMR had never
existed.192
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RETROACTIVE OR
NON-RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
One final note provides more evidence of the history of
retroactive effects when vacating a rule. Prior to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,193
which outlawed agencies from making retroactive rulemakings
unless expressly authorized by Congress to do so, agencies would
make regulations that became effective during the period the
vacated regulation had controlled. The intention was to negate
the disruptive effect of the retroactive nature of vacatur. While

although Duke had previously identified the Cliffside plant as a “major source”
for mercury and other HAPs. They now contend that they had used inaccurate
data when estimating the emissions and that the Cliffside plant is a “minor
source” and thus is not required to apply MACT. The NC DAQ has agreed with
this conclusion and changed the Cliffside plant to minor source classification. In
response to this ruling, the federal case has been put on hold in lieu of suits over
state matters such as this classification. See Letter from James L. Turner,
President and Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Franchised Elec. & Gas, to Keith
Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dept. of Env’t & Natural Res. (Dec. 4,
2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/permits/psd/docs/cliffside/Final_Letter
_to_DAQ_12042008.pdf.
192. Since the holding of this case, both parties have filed appeals, with Duke
questioning the holding and petitioners hoping for an injunction since North
Carolina, at Duke’s request, has since reclassified the Cliffside plant as a minor
source of HAPs so MACT analysis would not be necessary. The reclassification
of the Cliffside Plant as a minor source led to challenges of that decision and the
permit issued in regards to it on the state level before the Office of
Administrative Hearings in North Carolina. Thus the federal court applied the
doctrine of abstention to no longer enforce its previous ruling since the state
courts were now directly involved and the direct issue in the federal case about
the MACT analysis was not. See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC, No. 108CV318, 2009 WL 1940048 (W.D.N.C. July 2, 2009). The
court of appeals did find however, that the environmental plaintiffs had
prevailed in the issue on some account. Therefore, they were entitled to
attorney’s fees. See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas,
LLC, No. 08-2370, 2011 WL 1421794 (4th Cir. 2011).
193. See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
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this practice is no longer legal, it does show that vacating a rule
has a history of retroactive disruption.194
In addition, the policy implication to an agency if regulation
vacaturs were not given retroactive effect would be to effectively
hand the agency significantly more power than we have seen in
the past. Because the available recourse when an agency crafts
an illegal regulation is through the court system—a system filled
with lengthy procedures and delays—agencies would effectively
be able to craft any regulation they pleased, no matter how
egregious, and those whom it benefited would be able to reap the
rewards of such a regulation until it was vacated months if not
years later. When applied to the specific situation addressed in
this article, it implies that EPA could craft a regulation stating
that EGUs do not have to install any pollution control measures,
and so long as an entity was permitted for construction before
such a regulation was vacated by the courts, the EGU would be
able to emit pollutants for years to come with no liability. This is
simply not sound public policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a very strong case to be made that the judicial
vacatur of an agency regulation should be applied retroactively
when a remedy is available. For example, the ruling in New
Jersey v. EPA should be retroactively applied to EGUs permitted
while CAMR was in effect prior to being vacated in New Jersey v.
EPA, including the Duke Energy Cliffside plant. The plain
meaning of “vacate” implies that the law should be voided and set
aside; courts have interpreted this to mean that it should be as if
the vacated regulation never existed.195 The Supreme Court and
D.C. Circuit have well-established case law supporting a strong
presumption of retroactivity for decisions, the sole exceptions to
this presumption exhibiting criteria that are not met in New
Jersey v. EPA.196
This case law also includes statements
supporting the fact that detrimental effects to a party should not

194. See id.; see also Levin, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing an increase in
decisions employing remand without vacatur because retroactive rulemaking to
prevent disruption caused by vacatur is no longer an available remedy).
195. See supra Part II-A.
196. See supra Part II-B.
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be a determinative factor if a holding is applied retroactively.
Furthermore, when making their decision, the D.C. Circuit had
other options at their disposal, such as remand without vacatur
(instead of completely vacating the regulation), which could
prevent the disruption caused when a decision to vacate is
retroactively applied.197 In this case, they chose not to apply any
of these alternative remedies and therefore subjected the vacation
to retroactive effect.
While confusion remains among state departments of
environment over whether or not to now require MACT for
mercury and other HAPs from EGUs permitted prior to New
Jersey v. EPA, at least one federal court has ruled that an EGU
permitted during the time window after CAMR was promulgated
and prior to its vacatur must retroactively apply section 112(g) of
the CAA as if it had always been the governing law.198 Based on
these observations, it is the conclusion of this article that any
EGU permitted while CAMR was considered valid law is
currently in violation of the CAA if they do not conduct the proper
MACT analysis required by section 112 of the CAA for mercury
and other HAPs. This result is derived from the conclusion that
when agency regulations are ruled illegal by a court of law, both
case law and public policy support the notion that these
regulations carry no validity during the period prior to their
vacation.

197. See supra Part II-D.
198. See supra Part V-D.
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